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Lawyers Acting Badly, or Not? Misconduct in IP Litigation:
Recent Examples and the Issues They Raise
Lisa A. Dolak*
Misconduct in civil litigation is not a new phenomenon.1 Nor is it confined to particular
types of cases. Because of their characteristic intensity, 2 however, intellectual property cases
may be more likely to inspire bad behavior than other types of cases. In patent cases, in
particular, often much is at stake for both counsel3 and client.4 The potential outcomes range
from a judgment for the patent owner, potentially including trebled lost profits,5 a permanently
enjoined infringer6 and even an attorneys’ fees award,7 to a ruling that the asserted patent is
*

Angela S. Cooney Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. I acknowledge, with gratitude, the
excellent research support provided by my research assistant, Alison Taroli. I can be reached at
ladolak@law.syr.edu.
1

See Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480, 484-89 (1958)
(discussing judicial sanctions rulings from the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s).

2

See, e.g., Hon. Elizabeth D. Laporte, Managing the Runaway Patent Case, 964 PLI/PAT 935, 938 (2009) (“The
reasons for the intensity of patent litigation may range from the enormous economic stakes and competitive issues
often involved to the lure of the heightened prospect of reversal on appeal when key issues are routinely reviewed de
novo.”).

3

See, e.g., Jerry A. Riedinger, IP Ethics Potpourri--Commonly Arising Ethical Issues in Intellectual Property, 947
PLI/PAT 1257, 1272 (2008) (“Patent litigation often involves extremely valuable property, and high stakes, bet-thecompany issues. Attorney fees frequently exceed multiple millions. Success can lead a patent litigator to ever more
lucrative engagements, while failure can materially hinder an attorney's career.”).
4

See, e.g., id. at 1261 (“Much is at stake in IP litigation, especially patent litigation. The high stakes lead to bitter
fights, lost tempers and a desire to win-at-all costs.”); ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE
GUIDE x (Quorum Books 1999) (“In no other area of civil litigation are the potential rewards for the victor more
abundant or the penalties for the loser more catastrophic.”).
5

As discussed, for example, in Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001), lost profits are
available under particular circumstances pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284, which provides, in relevant part:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate
for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either event the court
may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.
6

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 283, “[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions
in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as
the court deems reasonable.” See also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (holding
that permanent injunctions are available in patent cases in accordance with “well-established principles of equity”).

7

See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
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partly or entirely invalid,8 or even unenforceable,9 with the patent owner ordered to pay the
infringement defendant’s attorneys’ fees.10 And the complexity and potential intensity only
increase when multiple patents and/or multiple accused products are involved. The associated
pressures seem, on occasion, to lead litigants and trial lawyers to succumb to the temptation to
step outside the bounds of vigorous advocacy.11
The trial judges in each of the recent IP cases discussed herein wrestled with the issue of
whether certain litigation tactics crossed the line between advocacy and abuse. The decisions
contend with a range of conduct, occurring at various phases of litigation. In several, the trial
courts’ decisions to sanction were reversed or modified on appeal or reconsideration.
Accordingly, these cases shed light on a question which challenges courts, litigants and trial
counsel: when it comes to zealous advocacy,12 how much zeal is too much zeal?13

SANCTIONING MISBEHAVIOR IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES
Parties and their counsel can be sanctioned under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 for “presenting” –
including “later advocating” – pleadings or other papers that include allegations unsupported by
law or evidence.14 As illustrated by the cases discussed below, however, recent IP litigation has
generated significant sanctions litigation implicating other law governing misconduct in federal
court,15 including some law specific to patent cases.
By way of background, discovery misconduct, such as unjustifiably certifying disclosures
as complete or otherwise evading disclosure obligations, can be punished pursuant to
8

See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming a judgment that the
asserted claims are invalid for lack of enablement).
9

See, e.g., Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming a
judgment of unenforceability for inequitable conduct).

10

See infra note 21 and accompanying text.

11

See Riedinger, supra note 3, at 1261 (“Because litigation – like most legal practice – is based upon an honor
system, IP litigation produces great temptation to shave ethical corners.”).
12

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 2 (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position
under the rules of the adversary system.”).
13

Although sanctions for litigation misconduct are available against both parties and counsel under various
provisions and legal theories, the primary focus of this paper is the conduct of counsel. Accordingly, the decisions
selected for discussion herein involved trial court rulings sanctioning counsel for litigation misconduct or rulings
against parties for conduct involving the participation of counsel.

14

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b) and (c).

15

Patent and copyright cases are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but even when not required to do
so, most intellectual property plaintiffs choose federal court. See, e.g., Steve Malin, Litigating Intellectual Property
Disputes in Texas State Court, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 473, 474 (2004); Note, How the Spending Clause Can
Solve the Dilemma of State Sovereign Immunity from Intellectual Property Suits, 51 DUKE L.J. 713, 743-44 (2001).

2

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)16 and 37.17 An attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously” can be sanctioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.18 And the
federal courts also have the “inherent power” to sanction parties and counsel for bad faith
litigation conduct.19 Attorney fee awards are available under each authority.20
In patent cases found “exceptional”, “prevailing part[ies]” may be awarded “reasonable
attorney fees.”21 In addition, as noted below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
16

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)(1) requires that:
[e]very disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every discovery request, response, or
objection must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's own name — or by the
party personally, if unrepresented — and must state the signer's address, e-mail address, and
telephone number. By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry:
(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct as of the time it is made; and
(B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or objection, it is:
(i) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new
law;
(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and
(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the
needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the action.

Regarding sanctions, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)(3) provides: “[i]f a certification violates this rule without substantial
justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on
whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the violation.”
17

Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 provides in relevant part:
If a party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e), . . . the court, on
motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by
the failure;
(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).

18

In full, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides: “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously
may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.”

19

See Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 45-47 (1991) (upholding the inherent authority of the federal courts to
impose sanctions, including attorney fees, for bad faith litigation conduct).

20

See supra notes 16, 17, 18, and 19.

21

According to 35 U.S.C. § 285, “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.” See, e.g., Aspex Eyewear Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 605 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(stating “A case may be found exceptional in terms of §285 when there has been some material inappropriate
3

has recently held that a trial court may properly include litigation misconduct as one factor
justifying an award of enhanced damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284.22

EXAMPLES OF RECENTLY SANCTIONED CONDUCT
Attorney misconduct conduct in some IP cases has generated some eye-catching
headlines, of late, including reports relating to sanctions in the form of enhanced damages,
attorneys’ fee awards, and even potential jail time to punish aggressive tactics on the part of
patent litigation counsel. For example, trial judges have rebuked counsel for:




pressing forward with infringement allegations in the face of adverse claim construction
rulings;23
“prolong[ing] the proceedings unnecessarily (thus unduly imposing upon the jury’s time),
[seeking] to mislead both the jury and the Court, and [flouting] the governing claim
construction as set forth by the Federal Circuit”;24
trying to prejudice jurors against the plaintiff patentee by asking them if they had “a
problem with a company that puts its headquarters offshore on a Caribbean island in
order to avoid paying U.S. taxes”, in violation of an order in limine;25 and

conduct related to the matter in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the
patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, or
other major impropriety” and collecting representative cases).
22

See infra note 39 and accompanying text.

23

Mike McPhee, Judge Makes Lawyers Pay for Frivolity, DENV. POST, Feb. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_8354619; Dan Slater, Judge Matsch Drops the Gavel on McDermott Lawyers,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, Feb. 27, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/02/27/judge-matsch-drops-the-gavel-onmcdermott-lawyers/ (linking to the court’s order found at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/matchorder.pdf).
As discussed infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text, this sanctions ruling was overturned on appeal.
24

Memorandum and Order, Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., Civil Action No. 01-10165-EFH,
Feb. 25, 2008, available at http://pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/cgibin/recentops.pl?filename=harrington/pdf/depuy%20memordr%20attysfees.pdf; see also Richard J. Ambroqi,
Experts Central to Two Huge Sanctions Awards, IPFRONTLINE, Mar. 28, 2008,
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=18015&deptid=7; Dan Slater, Attorney Sanctions in Patent Trials, a
Trend?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, Feb. 29, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/02/29/attorney-sanctions-in-patenttrials-a-trend/tab/print/.
As discussed infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text, this sanctions ruling was overturned on appeal.
25

Memorandum Opinion and Order, 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech., Case No. 2:04-CV-32-CE
(E.D. Tex. July 10, 2009) available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/ca/jail0714.pdf; see also Zusha Elinson, Patent
Lawyer Gets Jail Time for Banned Question, THE RECORDER, July 14, 2009, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432231822&hbxlogin=1.
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“persist[ing] in improperly trying to equate [the patentee’s] infringement case with the
current national banking crisis implying that [the patentee] was a banker seeking a
‘bailout.’”26

Two of these cases involved sanctions for what the trial courts regarded as the failure to
heed a prior patent claim construction ruling. In both, the sanctioned parties were Medtronic
companies, as enforcement plaintiffs in one and as infringement defendants in the other.
Sanctions were also imposed on Medtronic’s counsel in one of them. In both, however,
however, the Federal Circuit reversed the finding of litigation misconduct. In fact, sanctions
awards have been reversed or modified in a number of recent IP cases. Those decisions and their
implications are discussed below. But first, a few examples will show that recent cases have
involved a range of conduct and sanctions awards.

i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.
i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.27 involved computer technology,28 multiple
complex patent law issues,29 disputes about the admissibility of particular evidence,30 and
complicated damages calculations.31 The trial court’s decision is 65 pages long,32 but fewer than
two pages are devoted to the issue of trial counsel misconduct.33 However, that misconduct was
one factor in the court’s decision to award $40 million to the plaintiff in enhanced damages.34
In i4i, the court considered the conduct of Microsoft’s trial counsel to be relevant to
whether i4i, the prevailing patentee, was entitled to enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284. 35
26

Memorandum Opinion and Order, i4i Ltd. P’ship and Infrastructures for Info., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Case No.
6:07CV113 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2009) available at
http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/library/20090817i4imemo.pdf; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Microsoft Judge
Chastises Weil Lawyer for ‘Bailout’ Dig, ABA J. LEGAL ETHICS, Aug. 18, 2009,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/microsoft_judge_chastises_weil_lawyer_for_bailout_dig/.
27

670 F.Supp.2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d in relevant respects, 598 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

28

i4i, 670 F.Supp.2d at 573-76.

29

Id. at 576-88, 603-08.

30

Id. at 589-91.

31

Id. at 591-95.

32

i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07CV113 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2009).

33

Id. at 42-44.

34

i4i, 670 F.Supp.2d at 595-96.

35

35 U.S.C. § 284 provides, in relevant part: “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court. When the damages are
5

After discussing a number of factors relevant to the issue of enhancement,36 the court stated “also
favoring enhancement is Microsoft’s counsel’s litigation conduct, specifically during trial.”37 It
then described a line of argument by counsel that began at voir dire and continued through
closing arguments, despite the court’s repeated admonitions and warnings:
Throughout the course of trial Microsoft’s trial counsel persisted in arguing that it
was somehow improper for a non-practicing patent owner to sue for money
damages. He further persisted in improperly trying to equate i4i’s infringement
case with the current national banking crisis implying that i4i was a banker
seeking a “bailout.”
These improper arguments were made in spite of the Court’s warnings.
Microsoft’s trial counsel began voir dire by asking the following question to the
jury panel:
So an example might be that somebody has a patent that they’re using not
to protect a valuable product but someone’s copying, but because they are
attacking somebody because they just want to try to get money out of
them. So it fits, for example, with the litigation question Mr. Parker asked.
So if somebody felt that – let’s take this case for an example. If somebody
felt that the patents were being used in a wrong way, not to protect a
valuable product but a wrong way, could you find that patent invalid or
noninfringed?
In response, the Court sua sponte had counsel approach the bench and outside the
hearing of the jury asked:
THE COURT: I understand that you just told the jury if somebody was
using the patent not to compete, that that was the wrong way to use the
patent?
MR. POWERS: No, not to compete; just to get money, not to protect
anything. That’s what I asked.
THE COURT: What about protecting the patent?
MR. POWERS: I’ll ask it that way again.
THE COURT: I just – you know, I think you’re sort of misstating the law,
and I don’t want to embarrass you in front of the jury. But I would
appreciate it if you would clean that up.
not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed.”
36

i4i, 670 F.Supp.2d at 593-95 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).

37

i4i, 670 F.Supp.2d at 595.
6

MR. POWERS: I appreciate that. I will do that.
Despite this admonition, Microsoft’s trial counsel continued to misstate the law
and directly appeal to the jurors’ perceived prejudices. During opening statement,
he stated that “we’re here because the bankers decided to achieve liquidity” and
that “the banker cases are the ones where you don’t have a very successful
product, and the bankers decide to try to get their money out another way.” Again,
the Court sought to temper these statements with a specific instruction to the jury.
(“The law recognizes no distinction among types of patent owners. A patent
owner may be a competitor of an accused infringer, but it does not have to be. The
characterization of a patent lawsuit as good or bad or as misuse of the patent laws
based upon the status of the patent owner is inappropriate and should not play any
part in your deliberations.”). Regardless of this instruction, Microsoft’s trial
counsel’s improper statements were again reinforced during closing argument.
(“[i4i] had a product that failed. They had a patent that doesn’t work. They’re
asking for a bail-out. President Tyler [sic] didn’t give bankers a bail-out. We
would ask for you not to give one here either.”).38
On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld that the district court’s decision to award enhanced
damages in the amount of $40 million (on an underlying compensatory award of $250 million)
and to include the trial counsel’s misconduct as one factor justifying enhancement.39

O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.
Counsel for infringement defendant Beyond Innovation Technology Co. Ltd. (“BiTEK”)
also attempted to bias the jury against a patentee plaintiff, but wound up with a contempt citation
and a 48-hour (suspended) jail sentence!40 During voir dire, the defendant’s attorney asked the
jury panel “are there any of you who have a problem with a company that puts its headquarters
offshore on a Caribbean island in order to avoid paying U.S. taxes?”41 Counsel for the plaintiff
objected immediately, and the court scheduled a hearing on the issue following jury selection.42
Following that hearing, the court held that counsel’s question violated the pre-trial order
in limine, which read: “Defendants may refer to the fact that O2 is a Cayman Islands
corporation. The motion [to preclude evidence regarding O2’s Cayman Islands headquarters]
38

i4i, 670 F.Supp.2d at 595-96 (court’s citations to trial transcript and jury charge omitted).

39

i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (agreeing with Microsoft “that it
would have been improper to enhance damages based solely on litigation misconduct”).

40

O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2:04-CV-32-CE, 2009 WL 2047617, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex.
July 10, 2009).

41

Id. at *2.

42

Id.

7

is granted to the extent defendants seek to offer evidence relating to taxation.”43 It rejected the
attorney’s explanation: “that he believed, by asking the questions in a hypothetical manner,
without mentioning [the plaintiff], he would avoid violating the order”,44 and held the violation
to be “flagrant and intentional.”45 It suspended the sentence pending the completion of the trial,
and ruled that the sentence would be considered discharged if the attorney violated no further
orders.46
At the hearing, the court reserved the separate issue of an appropriate sanction against the
attorney’s client – BiTEK – and set forth its analysis regarding that issue in its subsequent
order.47 Preliminarily, the court held that BiTEK, too, should be sanctioned, for “undermin[ing]
the parties’ expectations to a trial by a jury selected from the panel summoned according to the
regular process of the court.”48 The court set forth two goals it hoped to achieve via the
sanctions: “cur[e] the prejudice caused by the violation and deter[] future litigants from violating
the court’s orders in limine.”49 It declined O2 Micro’s request for the imposition of “‘death
penalty’ sanctions”, citing the Federal Circuit’s decision in ClearValue Inc. v. Pearl River
Polymers Inc., discussed below,50 and thoughtfully considered the suitability of a number of
“lesser sanctions” under the particular circumstances of this case.51
The court rejected punitive or curative jury instructions as potentially prejudicing
BiTEK’s co-defendants and noted that “such instructions would only highlight the overly
prejudicial question to the panel.”52 Precluding BiTEK’s evidence would not suffice, as the
other defendants – purchasers of BiTEK’s products – could and would be expected to introduce
evidence (on the issues of infringement and willfulness) helpful to BiTEK.53 As for financial
sanctions, the court declined to impose the costs of jury selection, observing that such a sanction
“would effectively allow a litigant to buy a new jury panel by intentionally violating the court’s

43

Id. at *1-2 (italics in original).

44

Id. at *2.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

See id. at *2-4.

48

Id. at *2.

49

Id.

50

See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.

51

O2 Micro, No. 2:04-CV-CE, 2009 WL 2047617 at *2-3.

52

Id. at *3.

53

Id.

8

orders in limine”, and “[e]ven a substantial fine,” because in high-value cases “parties might well
have the incentive and the financial resources to engage in this type of conduct.”54
Ultimately, the court gave O2 Micro the option of proceeding with the tainted jury, or
accepting a package of sanctions against BiTEK including the following:







Mistrial;
Severance of the case against BiTEK;
Restricted voir dire time and peremptory challenges (half as much/many as O2;)
Jury instruction that BiTEK received less time in voir dire because “its counsel
intentionally violated a court order in the first jury selection”, necessitating the
impaneling of a new jury;
Exclusion of BiTEK’s expert testimony on infringement, and
Payment of “all of the parties’ costs and attorneys’ fees involved in the first jury selection
and . . . the plaintiff’s cost and attorneys’ fees in having to try the severed case against the
remaining defendants.” 55

The court’s discussion illustrates the special challenges associated with fashioning a remedy for
misconduct occurring in the presence of the jury, particularly in high-stakes cases involving
multiple parties.

Commil USA v. Cisco Sys., Inc.
The conduct of a litigation attorney for infringement defendant Cisco Systems, Inc.
reportedly recently prompted a Marshall, Texas, federal magistrate judge to offer to entertain a
new trial motion on the part of Commil USA, the patentee.56 The attorney, Otis Carroll, is
accused of seeking to play to potential anti-foreign bias by asking the jury to reject the
infringement claim so that Commil’s President Johathan David “won't fly back home [to Israel]
later this week with a sack full of Cisco's money that belongs to Cisco and its employees here in
Texas."57 But more inflammatory was Mr. Carroll’s remark to Mr. David, who is Jewish, during
cross-examination. Mr. Carroll asked Mr. David if he’d met in Marshall with one of the
inventors of the patent at issue. Following Mr. David’s answer that the two had met for dinner at
the Bodacious Barbecue restaurant, Mr. Carroll guessed “I bet not pork” regarding what Mr.
David had eaten.58
54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Andrew Longstreth, Allegedly Anti-Semitic Remarks by Cisco Outside Counsel Prompt Commil Request for New
Trial, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, June 24, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202462963733#.

57

Id.

58

Miriam Rozen, Pork remark in patent case prompts magistrate to say he will entertain new trial motion, TEXAS
LAWYER BLOG, May 24, 2010, http://texaslawyer.typepad.com/texas_lawyer_blog/2010/05/pork-remark-in-patentcase-prompts-magistrate-to-say-he-will-entertain-new-trial-motion.html.
9

Magistrate Judge Chad Everingham promptly issued a curative instruction to the jury,
stating "Sometimes when a lawyer injects irrelevant information into a case it's because he
perceives a weakness in the merits of his case. I don't know whether that's why it happened in
this case, but you can consider that as you're evaluating the testimony and the evidence in this
case."59 But after the jury came back with a $3.7 million verdict – far short of the $53 million
the patentee had requested – the magistrate judge expressed concern about the effect of the
remark on the jury, and invited the new trial motion.60

Kellogg v. Nike, Inc.
Kellogg v. Nike, Inc.61 is a fourth recent patent case in which the trial court was
concerned about remarks of counsel during trial, but this time the statements related to the
merits. In this design patent case, the court had ordered in limine that “any argument or evidence
that was inconsistent with the . . . claim construction would be irrelevant,” and gave specific
guidance regarding terms counsel could and could not use to refer to the accused products during
a hearing immediately before trial.62 In its order on post-trial motions, including the plaintiff’s
request for attorney fees, the court cited several instances at trial63 in which the defendant
“repeatedly attempted to reintroduce and reargue theories rejected by the Court in the claim
construction order and the order on motions in limine.”64 According to the court: “The conduct
proscribed by those orders was clear. Nike’s misconduct occurred throughout the trial and
Kellogg preserved objections to much of the misconduct.”65 The court found that:
Nike’s conduct at trial and throughout this litigation revealed a strategy calculated
to misdirect the jury’s focus from the proper comparison of the patented design to
the design on Nike’s accused hats to an improper comparison of the whole hats
shown in Kellogg’s patent to Nike’s accused hats. Nike made attempts to lead the
jury to a product-to-product comparison that was contrary to established law and
to the court’s instructions. Nike was obliged to either accept the court’s claim
construction ruling as the law of the case or to proceed with an interlocutory
appeal. Instead, Nike chose to pursue a strategy of distorting the court’s claim

59

Joe Mullin, Patent Litigation Weekly: Questionable Trial Comments in E.D. Tex., Take Two, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER, June 4, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202459283046.
60

See Rozen, supra note 58.

61

Kellogg v. Nike, Inc., No. 8:07CV70 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2009).

62

Id., slip op. at 3-4.

63

Id. at 5-11.

64

Id. at 19.

65

Id.

10

construction and attempting to lead the jury to an improper interpretation of the
claimed invention that would correspond to its proposed, but rejected, claim
construction.66
Nevertheless, the court declined to order a new trial on the ground that its “instructions . . .
served to obviate any prejudice to Kellogg’s case occasioned by Nike’s lapses.”67 The court did,
however, rule that Nike’s conduct – its “strategy of giving superficial recognition to the court’s
claim construction rulings, while continuing to press its own interpretation of the claim”,
combined with its “conduct in asserting and pursuing [its] claim of invalidity”, after having
sought and obtained dismissal of its invalidity counterclaim on the eve of trial68 – constituted
“[v]exatious conduct” warranting a finding of exceptionality under 35 U.S.C. § 285, an award of
attorney fees and costs reasonably related to the invalidity claim, and a denial of an award of
costs under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54 in favor of Nike, despite the jury’s verdict in its favor.69 Ultimately,
plaintiff Kellogg was awarded in excess of $400,000 in attorney fees and costs on account of
defendant’s misconduct.70

St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants v. Palm Inc.
One of the more exotic reports, of late, of discovery-related misconduct appears in a
Special Master’s report in a patent litigation involving St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants
Inc. and Canon Inc. over digital camera technology.71 According to the report, Canon had a
consulting agreement with a third party, Mirage Systems, Inc., under which “Mirage agreed to
help Canon establish that Mirage was the rightful owner of the patents at issue in the case, and
not to assert those patents against Canon” in exchange for a payment (from Canon to Mirage) of
$75,000, in addition to reimbursements for expenses and “‘lost time’”, for a total of
$167,693.97.72 Yet in the litigation, Mirage was a fact witness.73 The report quotes the trial
judge’s take on the arrangement, as follows: “‘My interpretation would be possibly . . . you paid

66

Id. at 19-20.

67

Id. at 20.

68

Id. at 2.
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Id. at 22-23.
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Kellogg v. Nike, Inc., No. 8:07CV70, 2010 WL 323994, at *6 (D. Neb. Jan. 20, 2010). The court held that
plaintiff “Kellogg was a prevailing party with respect to [Nike’s] invalidity counterclaim.” Id. at *1.
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See Marius Meland, Canon Settles Patent Case Amid Ethics Questions, May 2, 2006,
http://www.law360.com/print_article/6378; Report and Recommendation Regarding Motions to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Jurisdictional Discovery, St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants v. Palm Inc.,
et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37512 at 7-8 (D. Del. May 4, 2009).
72

Id.
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the guy $75,000 to show up and say he owns the patents . . . it sounds like you paid him $75,000
to come and say what you wanted.’”74
Moreover, attorneys for St. Clair asserted that Canon improperly failed to disclose the
agreement during discovery, and the Special Master concluded that that failure was “unjustified
and fraudulent.”75 As a result, the Special Master recommended the revocation of the pro hac
vice admissions of Canon’s counsel, as well as a ban on the participation of that firm in future
proceedings in the matter at hand.76

SANCTIONS AWARD REVERSALS
The above-summarized decisions illustrate that recent IP cases have involved a wide
range of sanctioned conduct. More examples follow. However, in each of the following cases,
the sanctions order was subsequently reversed or revised, either on reconsideration or appeal.
Some questions raised by these decisions are explored below. But first, the decisions are
summarized.
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.
The challenges of discovery compliance and of detecting non-compliance are wellknown. The complexities, burdens, and opportunities associated with electronic discovery have
multiplied those challenges. Recent orders sanctioning parties and counsel for discovery-related
misconduct in IP cases illustrate the power of the temptation to withhold damaging information –
electronic or not.
The serious nature of the misconduct at issue and the magnitude of the sanctions award in
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.77 were both eye-popping. On January 7, 2008, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California issued an order finding that
Qualcomm had “intentionally withheld tens of thousands of documents . . . requested in
discovery” – documents which “directly contradicted a key argument advanced by Qualcomm in
pretrial motions and throughout trial and supported a defense asserted by Broadcom.”78 It also
found that “six attorneys assisted Qualcomm in withholding the critical documents by failing to
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the adequacy of Qualcomm’s document production and by
ignoring warning signs, which indicated that the document search was not thorough and that
74

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions and Sanctioning Qualcomm,
Incorporated and Individual Lawyers, Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 911 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 7, 2008).

78

Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2010 WL 1336937 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010).
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Qualcomm’s document production was not complete.”79 The court imposed monetary sanctions
on Qualcomm in the amount of $8.5 million,80 and referred the attorneys to the California State
Bar for investigation and possible discipline.81
A critical issue in the case was whether Qualcomm waived its right to enforce its patents
against Broadcom by participating in a technology standards-setting organization known as the
“JVT.”82 In its opinion affirming the trial court’s finding that Qualcomm’s litigation misconduct
was sufficient justification for its exceptional case determination,83 the Federal Circuit described
the conduct at issue as follows:
Throughout discovery, motions practice, trial, and even post-trial, Qualcomm
adamantly maintained that it did not participate in the JVT during development of
the [relevant technology] standard. Despite numerous requests for production and
interrogatories requesting documents relating to Qualcomm’s JVT participation
prior to adoption of the . . . standard, Qualcomm repeatedly represented to the
court that it had not such documents or emails. On January 24, 2007, however,
one of the last days of trial, a Qualcomm witness testified that she had emails that
Qualcomm previously claimed did not exist. Later that day, Qualcomm produced
twenty-one emails belonging to that witness. As the district court later
discovered, these emails were just the “tip of the iceberg,” as over two hundred
thousand more pages of emails and electronic documents were produced posttrial. The district court later determined that these documents and emails
“indisputably demonstrate that Qualcomm participated in the JVT from as early
as January 2002, that Qualcomm witnesses . . . and other engineers were all aware
of and a part of this participation, and that Qualcomm knowingly attempted in
trial to continue the concealment of evidence.”84
On April 2, 2010, however, after granting the six attorneys “an almost unlimited
opportunity to conduct discovery and to present new facts”, the trial court decided not to impose
sanctions on the six attorneys, concluding that they “made significant efforts to comply with
their discovery obligations.”85 It maintained, however, that “this massive discovery failure
resulted from significant mistakes, oversights, and miscommunication on the part of both outside
counsel and Qualcomm employees”,86 and summarized a number of those errors in its Order
79

Id. at *1.

80

Id.
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Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Id. at 1008.
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Id. at 1027.
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Id. at 1009.
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Qualcomm, 2010 WL 1336937 at *1-2.
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Id. at *2.
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Declining to Impose Sanctions Against the Responding Attorneys and Dissolving the Order to
Show Cause, including:





“[A]n incredible breakdown in communication . . . permeat[ing] all of the relationships”
among the involved Qualcomm employees, legal staff, and outside counsel;87
No evidence “that either in-house lawyers or outside counsel met in person with the
appropriate Qualcomm engineers . . . at the beginning of the case to explain the legal
issues and discuss appropriate document collection”;88
Outside counsel’s failure to “obtain sufficient information from any source to understand
how Qualcomm’s computer system is organized”;89 and
The failure of any attorney to take “supervisory responsibility for verifying that the
necessary discovery had been conducted . . ..”90

However, the court found that “[t]hese failures were exacerbated by an incredible lack of candor
on the part of the principal Qualcomm employees”, and that the attorneys “did repeatedly try to
determine whether Qualcomm had participated in the JVT proceedings during the [relevant] time
. . ..”91 Thus, it concluded that the attorney responsible for signing the discovery responses did
so “after a reasonable, although flawed, inquiry”, and found that “the involved attorneys did not
act in bad faith.”92 Accordingly, the court declined to impose sanctions on them under either
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 or the court’s inherent authority.93
The court’s recent order declining to impose sanctions no doubt comes as a great relief to
the lawyers involved in this case. However, for them the experience has been life-altering,94 and
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *4.
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Id. *6-7.
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Debra Cassens Weiss, After Sanctions Are Lifted, Qualcomm Lawyers React:This ‘Can Happen to Anyone,’ ABA
J., Apr. 15, 2010,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/after_sanctions_are_lifted_qualcomm_lawyers_react_this_can_happy_to_a
nybody/ (quoting one of the attorneys assigned to the discovery responsibilities in Qualcomm, stating “[u]ntil this
case I’d always been going through life pretty happy and successful, just kind of going from one goal to the next
goal,” he said. “And it really derailed my path through life and kind of put me on ice.”); Ashby Jones, Sanctions
Lifted Against Qualcomm Attorneys (After Damage is Done), WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, Apr. 7, 2010,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/07/sanctions-lifted-against-qualcomm-lawyers-after-damage-is-done/tab/article/
(noting, as to the decision not to impose sanctions, that “It all comes too late . . . for four of the . . . lawyers, who’ve
since left big firm practice altogether.)”.
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the saga should serve as a chilling reminder for litigation counsel of the seriousness of their
discovery responsibilities.95

ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc.
In ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc.,96 the Federal Circuit agreed that the
plaintiffs and their attorney had engaged in sanctionable conduct, but reversed the non-monetary
sanctions and significantly reduced the monetary sanctions awarded by the district court.97 Patent
owner Richard Haase and his exclusive licensee, ClearValue, sued Pearl River and several other
defendants for patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation.98 Whether the wastewater
treatment polymers Pearl River sold had molecular weights over one million was a “critical
issue” in the case,99 and the defendants sought the production of the results of any molecular
weight tests the plaintiffs had run on Pearl River’s products.100 The plaintiffs objected to the
request as burdensome and “seeking work product or trial preparation materials that are not
discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”, but did not provide the defendants
with a privilege log listing any test results.101
Ultimately, it came to light that the plaintiffs had tested Pearl River’s products, and that
those products had a molecular weight of “substantially below the one million limitation” in the
patent at issue.102 Further, the plaintiffs’ expert had reviewed the test results.103 Thus, no work
product protection applied.104 And, the plaintiffs’ counsel, Gordon Waggett, had been a party to
the email exchanges between the patent owner and the expert relating to the test results.105
According to the trial court, only the “‘ultimate sanction’” of dismissal of the plaintiffs’
claims was appropriate, given the critical nature of the withheld information and the fact that the
95

Cassens Weiss, supra note 94 (quoting a second Qualcomm discovery attorney, stating “I think the take-away is
that this kind of thing can happen to anybody.”).
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information was suppressed for over a year and a half.106 It struck the plaintiffs’ pleadings,
entered judgment for the defendants, and awarded the defendants attorney’s fees, costs and
expenses in excess of $2.7 million incurred over the period of the violation,107 including under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 and 37108, the court’s inherent authority,109 35 U.S.C. § 285,110 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920.111
In so holding, the trial court implicitly rejected the attorney’s excuse: “that he had a
‘total disconnect’ with respect to the testing[,] ‘was sorry’ for not producing the test results . . .
because he now appreciated he was ‘obviously wrong’ and that the results were ‘not work
product’” and that “he was ‘rusty’ and had ‘been out of the litigation loop’ for almost nine
years.”112 Undermining this testimony, in the view of the trial court, was the fact that following
the email exchange between the patent owner and the expert, on which the attorney was copied,
the attorney wrote to the patent owner and instructed him to “stop copying [the expert] to ‘best
preserve priv/work product.’”113
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit reversed the non-monetary sanctions and eliminated the
monetary sanctions but for the $121,107.38 in attorney’s fees under Rules 26 and 37.114 It
concluded that the conduct at issue was “less egregious” than discovery violations the Fifth
Circuit had held did not justify dismissal.115 Consequently, the defendants were no longer
106

Id. at 1298-99.

107

Id. at 1301.

108

Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 provides in relevant part:
If a party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e), . . . the court, on
motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by
the failure;
(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).
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See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, “[a] judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs...fees and
disbursements for printing and witnesses.”
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See ClearValue, 560 F.3d at 1298.
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Id. at 1308-10. The Federal Circuit reviews discovery sanctions decisions under the applicable regional circuit
law. Id. at 1304 (citing Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
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“prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and costs under 28
U.S.C. § 1920, so those awards were reversed, as well.116 However, in upholding the district
court’s ruling that the conduct of the plaintiffs and their counsel was sanctionable, the Federal
Circuit specifically identified the violation (“they withheld test results reviewed by a testifying
expert”), deferred to the trial court’s evaluation regarding the credibility of the patent owner, the
expert, and the attorney, and upheld the court’s “finding that the failure to disclose was not
‘harmless’”.117

Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersystems GmbH
In Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersystems GmbH,118 the
trial court assessed nearly $4.4 million in attorney fees, costs, and interest against Medtronic and
the firm of McDermott Will & Emery (“MWE”), jointly and severally,119 “to enable BrainLAB
to recover the reasonable costs of defending itself in [the] litigation after a defense should no
longer have been necessary.”120 The court held that Medtronic engaged in vexatious litigation,
justifying an award of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285,121 and ruled that fees could be
assessed against the firm under the court’s inherent authority, if not under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.122
The court described the misconduct as follows:
After receiving the Court’s claims construction ruling, . . . Medtronic and the
MWE lawyers had a duty to reexamine this litigation and make an objective
assessment of the validity of Medtronic’s claims that BrainLAB’s products
infringed the patent claims as construed. They were obligated to accept those
rulings as the law of the case and proceed with an appeal by requesting
certification of an interlocutory appeal or conceding the [defendants’] summary
judgment motions. Rather than accept that the claims construction rulings
stripped the merits from this case, counsel chose to pursue a strategy of distorting
those rulings, misdirecting the jury to a different reading of the claim language,
and blatantly presenting the jury with a product comparison contrary to
established law and the Court’s cautionary instructions. Additionally, they
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deceived the jury into accepting the statements in BrainLAB’s FDA application as
an admission of patent infringement. Capping all of this was a closing argument
that misdirected the jury’s attention from the focus of the case, carefully crafted to
avoid the Court’s instruction. That argument distorted both the evidence and the
law, misleading the jury into a plaintiffs’ verdict.123
Although the court recognized that it had erred in declining to grant the defendants’ motions for
summary judgment,124 it clearly did not welcome what it described as Medtronic’s and MWE’s
position “that the Court had the obligation to stop any trial conduct that stepped over the line of
zealous advocacy[; and] that they should not be held responsible for what they were able to get
away with during the trial presentation.”125 The court accused Medtronic and its counsel of
capitalizing on the particular complexities of patent litigation:
The conduct of Medtronic and its counsel constituted much more than a few
instances of overstepping during a hard-fought battle. This case involved
complicated technology. Patent law is complex and not intuitive to the average
juror. Parties and counsel have an obligation to refrain from seeking to take
advantage of those complexities by employing misleading strategies. . . .
Medtronic’s untenable positions and misleading tactics complicated the Court’s
task of analyzing the legal issues.126
The Federal Circuit reversed on appeal, however.127 The court considered each ground
the trial court cited for its finding that the case was exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and held
that none could support that finding.128 It concluded that “[b]ecause . . . it was not unreasonable
for Medtronic to seek relief in light of the court’s claim construction,” the trial court’s ruling that
MWE should be jointly liable for the sanctions award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 “a fortiori” could
not stand.129 According to the court, “[e]ven if [MWE] had concluded that Medtronic's prospects
for ultimately prevailing in the litigation were significantly diminished by the court's claim
construction order, it was not unreasonable for [MWE] to continue to press its client's case in
light of the arguments that remained available to it.”130 In so ruling, the court even cited
123
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authority suggesting that MWE was obligated to so continue.131 Finally, while respecting the
trial court’s “judgment that counsel's use of the FDA submission evidence was improper”, the
Federal Circuit held that such use “was not sufficiently egregious to justify the imposition of
sanctions under the court's inherent authority”, citing the Supreme Court’s admonition that “a
court’s inherent powers ‘must be exercised with restraint and discretion.’”132

DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.
About two weeks after the above-discussed ruling against Medtronic, a different court
assessed attorney fees (under 35 U.S.C. § 285) and a $10 million penalty (under the court’s
inherent authority) against Medtronic for what it regarded as a similar abuse: “[seeking] to take
advantage of the technical and legal complexities inherent in [the] case.”133 This time, the
Medtronic companies were defending a patent case, and the court cited their “failure to accept
the claim construction governing this case,” adoption of a “defense to infringement . . . wholly
based on an attempt to obscure, evade, or minimize the Federal Circuit’s construction of the
patent-in-suit”,134 and attempt “to mislead both the jury and the Court . . ..”135
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the attorney fees and sanctions award, attributing
the trial court’s finding of exceptionality (based on the litigation conduct at issue) to a
misunderstanding of the relevant law.136 In overturning the district court’s ruling, the appellate
panel distinguished between the mere assertion of a defense and the manner in which the defense
is litigated.137

Montgomery v. eTreppid Technologies, LLC
The conduct at issue in each of the cases described above appears to have been motivated
by a desire to win the client’s case. The sanctions in Montgomery v. eTreppid Technologies,
LLC,138 on the other hand, grew out of satellite litigation apparently pursued to achieve tactical
advantage in a dispute with the client’s former counsel over fees.139
131
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reasonable arguments on behalf of his client, even if the attorney disagrees with them.”)).
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After attorney Michael Flynn withdrew as counsel for Dennis Montgomery in
Montgomery’s dispute with eTreppid over Montgomery’s alleged misappropriation of
eTreppid’s trade secrets and eTreppid’s alleged copyright infringement,140 the Liner Grode Stein
Yankelevitz Regestreif & Taylor LLP firm (“Liner Grode”)141 and two of its attorneys, Deborah
Klar and Teri Pham, stepped in to continue the Montgomery representation.142 The two key facts
underlying the ensuing complications are that (1) Mr. Flynn sought “past due attorney’s fees and
costs in excess of $635,000, and . . . Montgomery . . . did not wish to pay him”, so Mr. Flynn
filed a retaining lien under Nevada law; and (2) the United States, which had initiated search
warrant proceedings against Montgomery, had “invoked the military and state secrets
privilege”.143 As a result, the presiding Nevada magistrate judge had set a hearing to consider
Flynn’s withdrawal motion and issues relating to the return of Montgomery’s client files in light
of the fee dispute and the government’s state secrets assertion.144
Meanwhile, knowing these facts,145 Ms. Klar and/or Ms. Pham initiated a series of
proceedings and took other steps the court ultimately held to justify the imposition of monetary
sanctions against them, Liner Grode, and Montgomery in the amount of $204,411, the referral of
the two attorneys to the Nevada State Bar and California State Bar, and “additional sanctions” in
the form of community legal service obligations upon them.146 Those actions included:



Filing “a complaint for preliminary and injunctive relief in Los Angeles Superior Court
on behalf of [Montgomery]” alleging that Mr. Flynn’s refusal to turn over client files was
unjustified and violated the California Rules of Professional Conduct;147
Filing a “notice of objection to [Mr. Flynn’s retaining] lien on the ground that the
California Superior Court had jurisdiction over the matter because they had already filed
[that] complaint”;148
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Submitting “an application for arbitration of a fee dispute to the San Diego County Bar
Association [without] disclos[ing any] information whatsoever concerning the pending
proceedings” regarding the client file issues in the Nevada district court;149
Drafting (for Mr. Montgomery) and filing a declaration falsely stating that Mr.
Montgomery understood Mr. Flynn to be “licensed to practice only in Massachusetts”;150
Filing “an ex parte application for writ of possession in the Los Angeles Superior Court
proceedings” including representations inconsistent with statements previously made in
the Nevada district court;151
Submitting a “request for investigation of Mr. Flynn with the Massachusetts Bar
Counsel”, where Flynn was licensed, without disclosing, inter alia, that Flynn had been
admitted pro hac vice in Nevada;152 and
Continuing to pursue relief in the California court notwithstanding the fact that the
Nevada court had “not only reaffirmed its jurisdiction over the client files, but also
formally retained jurisdiction over the fee dispute”.153

The magistrate concluded that the above-described conduct was the manifestation of a “litigation
strategy to insure—through any means possible—that Mr. Flynn would never be paid and to
crush him into submission in the process.”154 She found:
[T]here is clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Klar and Ms. Pham acted in bad
faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith with the intention to undermine this
court’s orders for the improper purpose of obtaining a more favorable forum for
resolution of the fee dispute and the turnover of the client files. Ms. Klar and Ms.
Pham willfully abused the judicial processes in this court and elsewhere, and they
149
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did so to delay or disrupt this litigation to gain a tactical advantage. As a result of
their conduct, Ms. Klar and Ms. Pham multiplied these proceedings, and they did
so unreasonably and vexatiously, resulting in an increase in the cost of the
proceedings to Mr. Flynn and a tremendous burden on the court to sort through
this byzantine web of misconduct.155
That was just the magistrate’s introduction to her sanctions analysis. She continued for several
pages, commenting on Ms. Klar’s “abdicat[ion of] her duties to the court and the attorneys she
supervised by engaging in a consistent pattern of gamesmanship, misrepresentations, and
outright contempt of this court and its orders”, and her “unrelenting . . . campaign to achieve her
desired end . . . at any cost to her client, to her junior partner, to the Liner firm, to Mr. Flynn, and
to the court.”156 As to Ms. Pham – the junior partner – the magistrate concluded that:
[She] was so focused on her assigned tasks—to remove the fee dispute and
turnover of the client files from [the Nevada] court’s jurisdiction—that she
suspended her own independent judgment and failed to critically consider any
legal, factual, or ethical impediments to her assignments. . . . As a result, [she]
engaged in a consistent pattern of material misrepresentations and the omissions
of material facts from her court papers, oral arguments, and bar complaints.
Conveying half truths and only part of the record in matters is a misrepresentation
and a breach of her ethical duties as a lawyer.157
Finally, regarding the firm, the magistrate held: “Ms. Klar was allowed to operate in the Liner
firm unchecked and unquestioned . . .. [T]he Liner firm acquiesced to or willingly carried out
Ms. Klar’s litigation strategy”, and was therefore also eligible for sanctions.158
Subsequently, upon consideration of the sanctioned firm’s and attorneys’ objections to
the magistrate’s ruling, the district judge reversed the sanctions order as to each “without
prejudice to any further proceedings consistent with [the district judge’s] order with respect to
Flynn’s motion for sanctions.”159 As to each of Liner Grode, Ms. Pham, and Ms. Klar, however,
the reversals were not based on the merits of the magistrate’s findings that the conduct at issue
was sanctionable. Instead, as to Liner Grode, the district judge held that the magistrate had
imposed sanctions on Liner Grode only under 28 U.S.C. § 1927,160 and that that provision does
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not apply to law firms.161 The district judge reversed the sanctions against Ms. Pham because
“the Magistrate Judge’s order setting the evidentiary hearing did not advise Pham that she may
be subject to sanctions personally”, and therefore that the magistrate “did not provide adequate
notice to Pham prior to imposing the sanctions in this matter”,162 and similarly concluded as to
Ms. Klar.163 As of this writing, then, the issue of whether the firm and the two attorneys
involved in this matter will face sanctions for their conduct in this case is unresolved.

Wolters Kluwer Financial Services Inc. v. Scivantage
The trial court in Wolters Kluwer Financial Services Inc. v. Scivantage164 also imposed
sanctions on two attorneys as well as their firm, although the order was reversed as to the firm
and one of the attorneys on appeal.165 The relevant facts are as follows: the Dorsey & Whitney,
LLP firm (“Dorsey”) filed suit on behalf of Wolters Kluwer against Scivantage and four
individuals in the Southern District of New York in March 2007.166 A confidentiality order
entered during discovery provided that certain information, including the documents at issue in
this case, “‘shall not be used [in] any other litigation proceeding,’” and that the district court
would retain jurisdiction to enforce those limitations.167
After the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff
decided to voluntarily dismiss the New York action and to re-file in the District of
Massachusetts.168 However, the Dorsey attorneys working on the case – Kristan Peters and Marc
Reiner – did not mention the pending dismissal during a subsequent conference call with the
court and opposing counsel, and Mr. Reiner mailed (instead of emailing) notice of the dismissal
to opposing counsel after Ms. Peters instructed him to file the motion (during or shortly after that
conference call).169 Ms. Peters subsequently filed a motion for temporary injunctive relief in the
Massachusetts court.170 Despite the New York court’s confidentiality order, she included 115
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pages of materials covered by that order with the temporary injunction motion in Massachusetts,
and delayed in returning discovery material to the defendants.171
The defendants moved for sanctions, but then settled with the plaintiff, and withdrew the
sanctions motion.172 Southern District Judge Harold Baer, Jr., however, was clearly not amused.
He issued a 129 page order173 decrying the “erosion of civility” in litigation practice,174 detailing
the entire (brief, but highly contentious) history of the case,175 and ultimately imposing nonmonetary sanctions, as follows:




Against Dorsey for (1) voluntarily dismissing the New York action and (2) using
discovery materials in the Massachusetts action;176
Against Mr. Reiner for (1) “cancelling a deposition on the date the suit was voluntarily
dismissed” and (2) “sending notice of the dismissal by mail but not electronically”;177
Twenty-four separate sanctions against Ms. Peters, including for:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

A misleading statement in the complaint;178
Statements – “made in bad faith for an improper purpose” – at the
temporary restraining order in the New York action;179
A letter containing what the court regarded as frivolous discovery-related
arguments;180
A declaration in which, the court found, she had “use[d a] semi-colon to
provide a misleading interpretation of [the emergency motions judge]”;181
Conduct (“attempt[ing] to create a false record”, and a “meritless”
contention on the record) at a deposition;182
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(6)
(7)
(8)

(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

(13)
(14)

(15)

183

Id. at 543.

184

Id.

185

Id.
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Id. at 544.

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 545.

191

Id. at 546.

192

Id. at 547.

Disclosure of “information from an ‘attorneys’ eyes only’ deposition to an
employee of her client”;183
“[B]ad faith” threats of sanctions and contempt motions at another
deposition;184
“At various times in these depositions, . . . refus[ing] to show witnesses
documents from which she quoted, show[ing] documents to witnesses
from across the table, refus[ing] to provide copies of documents to
counsel, refus[ing] to allow witnesses to take breaks, and threaten[ing] to
call security when opposing counsel stated his intention to approach a
Magistrate with a discovery dispute”;185
A meritless motion for contempt and sanctions;186
Conduct “intend[ing] to mislead the Court by implying that [d]efendants
. . . acted in bad faith”;187
Making “misleading and inaccurate” statements “to the Court that
[d]efendants had failed to comply with their [discovery] obligations”;188
Making “misleading and inaccurate” statement “to opposing counsel and
the Court” regarding her client’s discovery production “for the improper
purpose of gaining an advantage by procuring [d]efendant’s discovery
before [p]laintiff provided meaningful discovery of its own.”189
Making false statements to the Court regarding the availability of
witnesses for deposition and failing to appear for depositions;190
Committing “a fraud on the Court and on the [d]efendant” by participating
in a conference call with the Court in which “the subject of the scheduling
of future depositions was discussed”, while knowing “at that point that
those depositions would never happen” because the decision had been
made to voluntarily dismiss the case;191
Copying documents the defendants had previously produced in discovery
after the action had been dismissed “in bad faith, with the improper
purpose of the intention to use them in Massachusetts”;192
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(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

Misleading the Court “as to her knowledge of the state of transcripts”
following the Court’s order that transcripts be returned by a set date and
time;193
“[H]av[ing] the audacity to order additional copies [of deposition]
transcripts from the court reporter . . . in blatant and intentional disregard
of [the] Court’s order . . . to return all the transcripts”;194
“[U]s[ing] the transcripts in a bad-faith effort for the improper purposes of
gaining advantage (and expedient relief) in a new court after she had
‘judge-shopped,’ and after she had gained extensive discovery without
providing any discovery of her own, and in an effort to have that Court
eviscerate the Confidentiality Order that this Court had entered to govern
discovery produced in this litigation (which remained in force after this
litigation)”;195 and
Sending emails to the Court constituting “a transparent attempt to
convince [the] Court to wait on [ruling regarding transcripts in Dorsey’s
possession] until, Ms. Peters hoped, the Massachusetts Court might
eviscerate the Confidentiality Order . . ..”196

The district court’s language obviously reflects tremendous frustration with the conduct of
counsel.197
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the sanctions against the firm and against Mr.
Reiner – the junior partner on the case – could not stand.198 The court noted that voluntary
dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41 is a matter of right under the circumstances of this case, and
therefore that the firm was entitled to invoke dismissal even “to flee the jurisdiction or the
judge.”199 It further held, as to the firm, that “nothing in the record suggest that the decision to
permit the Massachusetts filing [of the deposition transcripts covered by the New York
confidentiality order] was made by the firm in bad faith or for any improper purpose.”200 As to
Mr. Reiner, the appeals panel ruled that the misdirection he employed when cancelling the
193
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deposition in question was not sanctionable,201 nor was sending opposing counsel the notice of
dismissal by mail, as “the rules do not make electronic service a requirement.”202 The court,
however, affirmed the district court’s imposition of sanctions against Ms. Peters.203

THE FALLOUT FROM MISCONDUCT AND THE RESULTING LITIGATION
The cases summarized above illustrate that trial judges and opposing litigants and counsel
are motivated by a variety of concerns in imposing and advocating for sanctions. Obviously,
litigants sometimes pursue sanctions for improper or illegitimate reasons, such as to prejudice the
trial judge against the opponent, or to intimidate or increase litigation expenses for the other side.
But concerns about compliance with discovery obligations, jury confusion, respect for court
orders, for example, orders in limine and on claim construction, and abuse of process are clearly
appropriate. For example, in each of Medtronic, DePuy, and Kellogg, the trial courts were
concerned about the potential for jury confusion regarding complex legal issues.204 And, as
noted above, patent litigators have also recently drawn the ire of courts for straightforward,
transparent appeals to jurors consisting of statements completely unrelated to the merits, but
clearly designed to prejudice the jury against their clients’ opponents.
Ensuring fundamental fairness is, ultimately, the responsibility of the trial judge.
Moreover, the above case summaries can leave no doubt that the conduct of trial counsel in some
cases warrants concern and sometimes sanctions. Given this, and the fact that litigation conduct
plays out within the purview of the trial judge, if not right before his or her eyes, it is only
appropriate that decisions to sanction are vested in the trial court’s discretion. It is notable,
therefore, that reviewing courts have reversed so many of the above-described sanctions orders,
including, in some cases, appellate courts applying abuse of discretion review.
Sometimes, sanctions orders are reversed on procedural grounds or because the trial court
misapplies the governing sanctions law. For example, in eTreppid, the district judge ruled that
the sanctioned attorneys had not received adequate notice that they were personally subject to
sanctions.205 And courts in IP cases have recently reversed sanctions imposed against law firms
201
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 on the grounds that such sanctions are available only as to individual
attorneys.206
But the sanctions were lifted in several of the above-described cases “on the merits”, i.e.,
because the reviewing court (or, in Qualcomm, the magistrate judge on reconsideration) regarded
the conduct at issue as either insufficiently egregious (as in Qualcomm and ClearValue), as not
unreasonable (as in Medtronic), or even as entirely within the rights of the sanctioned firm or
attorney (as in DePuy and, in the case of the Dorsey firm and attorney Reiner, in Wolters
Kluwer). These reversals raise a number of questions.

Aren’t Sanctions Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion? First, relevant fact-finding, for
example on the issue of exceptionality, is reviewed under the comparatively exacting clear error
standard.207 The decisions to impose sanctions and to what extent are reviewed for abuse of
discretion.208 However, “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its
ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”209
And the Second Circuit, at least, has held that sanctions rulings are in a category of their own
when it comes to appellate review: “when the district court is ‘accuser, fact finder and
sentencing judge’ all in one, our review is ‘more exacting than under the ordinary abuse-ofdiscretion standard.’”210

Are Reviewing Courts Too Tolerant? To be sure, the “judge, jury and executioner”
nature of sanctions rulings, combined with the very serious potential ramifications of such
rulings for attorneys and law firms, justify appropriately searching review. Nevertheless, it
206
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seems fair to ask whether reviewing courts are sometimes too tolerant. Consider these examples
of conduct held not sanctionable in recent IP cases:




Cancelling a deposition under false pretenses to conceal the true reason for the
cancellation, i.e., that the suit was being voluntarily dismissed and re-filed elsewhere;211
The knowing pursuit of a meritless lawsuit;212
Failing, during the course of discovery, to:
- meet or “discuss appropriate document collection” with the client’s employees
- “obtain sufficient information . . . to understand how [the client’s] computer system is
organized”; or
- take “supervisory responsibility for verifying that the necessary discovery had been
conducted . . ..”213

Surely there are limits to what opposing parties, counsel and the courts can reasonably be
expected to tolerate when it comes to litigation conduct. And the nature and incidence of the
conduct at issue in the above-described cases – all of which occurred during the last few years –
reasonably suggests that perhaps litigation counsel and reviewing courts are expanding the
definition of acceptably zealous advocacy.

What About the Trial Judges? It is difficult to read the sanctions orders discussed above
without feeling empathy for the challenges trial judges encounter in the face of aggressive
litigation tactics. Some of these orders are very lengthy. They reflect, at least in some cases, an
enormous investment of work carefully reviewing the record and applying the applicable
standards. It must be very disappointing for a trial judge to have had to experience the conduct
in question first-hand, along with all of the associated attorney skirmishing – all while trying to
preserve the integrity of the underlying proceeding – only to have a reviewing court effectively
declare that the conduct wasn’t so bad after all. It is important to acknowledge the “wear and
tear” that overly zealous conduct and sanctions litigation inflict on trial courts.
In what is perhaps a reflection of that “wear and tear”, some sanctions orders manifest
apparent frustration on the part of trial judges.214 It is also, therefore, worth noting that judges
are only human, and that sanctions proceedings are high-drama, high-stakes events that
potentially evoke emotions in all involved. Accordingly, the possibility that frustration or
annoyance might have played a role in a sanctions decision also justifies careful review, at least
in some cases.
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Still, the number and nature of sanctions orders reversals, of late, seem to merit
consideration of whether/to what extent trial judges might hesitate, in future cases, to impose
sanctions. Perhaps motivated by such a concern, one member of the Federal Circuit Medtronic
panel wrote separately. In considering the potential effect of sanctions reversals on future
deliberations by trial judges, Judge Lourie’s concurring opinion is worth reading in its entirety:
I fully join the thorough opinion by Judge Bryson which carefully analyzes all the
panel's grounds for reversing the district court's sanctions.
However, the court's opinion should not be understood as in any way impeding
the desirability and ability of district court judges to control their courtrooms and
ensure that substantive arguments are reasonably based.
Many patent suits are brought these days with little chance of success. Appeals to
this court from summary judgments of non-infringement based on claim
constructions that are affirmed here are testament to the frequency of nonmeritorious claims brought in the district courts. Whether those suits are brought
because of poor and non-objective appraisals of plaintiffs' prospects or for less
worthy motives I do not know. But district court judges are entirely justified,
when they encounter frivolous claims and/or excessively hard-ball tactics, in
imposing sanctions on offending parties. They are enforcing respect for the courts
and the rights of innocent parties to be free of unjustified claims.
In this case, there certainly were a number of instances during the proceedings
below where the court felt that counsel had overstepped its bounds with their
arguments. We reversed because, as tellingly explained by Judge Bryson, each
incident had explanations that the panel believed were exonerating. But our action
in this case should not be viewed by district court judges as chilling their taking
charge of their courtrooms and ensuring that proper arguments are made against
proper opponents.
With those comments, I fully join in the court's opinion and judgment.215

What Motivates the Lawyers? As noted above, Judge Lourie posed several possible
reasons why parties file patent suits that are unlikely to succeed.216 In issuing sanctions in
Wolters Kluwer, Judge Harold Baer went further, offering his observations on what he believes
underlies misconduct in litigation:
While I am dismayed at the way in which many law firms today approach the
practice of law, I realize that for the most part it is none of my business and
215
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indeed not the business of the judiciary in general. The fact that partners are at
times made and retained for their rainmaking skills and not for their legal skill,
that the number of billable hours is not only the alpha and omega of bonuses but
that these hours—or at least the ones that count—often exclude pro bono hours, or
that who gets credit for originating a piece of business can throw a firm into
turmoil and prompt major internecine struggles, or that the bottom line has
eclipsed most everything else for which the practice of law stands or stood to the
extent that the practice of law is now frequently described as a business rather
than a profession. While decriable these are as I said really [sic] not my concern.
Rather, it is the fallout from such conduct, some of which we witnessed here, that
ineluctably drives some lawyers and some law firms to the kind of conduct that
played out before me at this hearing and that then becomes the business of the
courts.217
Judge Lourie and Judge Baer seem to agree that whatever the motivations of the responsible
parties, the trial courts have a responsibility to police court proceedings and to act to protect the
integrity of those proceedings when confronted with inappropriate tactics.

At What Price, Fairness? The magistrate judge in the Montgomery case concluded her
Order Re: Motions for Sanctions by acknowledging the solemn nature of the court’s
disposition.218 In further noting that “[t]he court has devoted many, many hours of time in
reviewing the papers filed, reading transcripts of relevant hearings, listening to recordings of
hearings, and considering carefully the facts and law before it”,219 the magistrate also reminded
us of another aspect of the costs that attorney misconduct and the associated sanctions
proceedings impose on the system – the diversion of precious court time and resources from the
merits of disputes. In some cases, of course, the resource drain goes beyond what the courts and
the parties invest in satellite sanctions litigation. When the conduct at issue imperils
fundamental fairness, an entire new trial may be necessary. Such situations not only prejudice
the offender’s opponent; they also injure other parties whose day in court is delayed as a result,
as well as the taxpayers who fund the court system. Trial and reviewing courts must also
recognize these consequences of litigation misconduct, and should more frequently acknowledge
them in sanctions decisions.

CONCLUSION
Even after expressing tremendous frustration and disappointment in the conduct of the
counsel in the Montgomery and Wolters Kluwer cases discussed above, each of Nevada District
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Court Magistrate Judge Cooke and Southern District Judge Baer sounded a hopeful note.
Magistrate Judge Cooke expressed the “sincere hope that those subject to the sanctions . . . will
never repeat this misconduct and that they will renew their professional commitment to abide by
the highest ideals of the legal profession and the rule of law.”220 Judge Baer further took note of
the reality that most lawyers conduct themselves in accordance with those ideals:
On a final note, the reader should be clear that I firmly believe the sentiment in
the Craco Report that “the actual level of professionalism brought to bear . . . by
thousands of lawyers across the state, in court and office, day in and day out, is
extraordinarily high.” I am hopeful that by casting a ray of light on this
anomalous and sanctionable behavior the public and the profession will be better
served.221
Judge Baer’s confidence in the majority of attorneys is no doubt well-placed. Nonetheless, the
decisions summarized herein should serve as sobering examples of how even intelligent,
experienced counsel can get caught up in the heat of the battle that is modern intellectual
property litigation, and the potentially devastating consequences of that conduct.
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